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I derive values of marginal changes in a public good for two-person households, measured 
alternatively by household member i’s willingness to pay (WTP) for the good on behalf of the 
household, WTPi(H), or by the sum of individual WTP values across family members, 
WTP(C). Households are assumed to allocate their resources in efficient Nash bargains over 
private and common household goods. WTPi(H) is then found by trading off the public good 
against household goods, and WTP(C) by trading the public good off against private goods. I 
then find that WTPi(H) is higher (lower) when member i has a high (low) marginal valuation 
of the public good, but on average represents WTP(C) correctly. Individuals then tend to 
represent households correctly on average when questioned about the household’s WTP for a 
public good, even when they are purely selfish and answer truthfully. Counting all members’ 
WTP answers on behalf of the household then leads to double counting. Pure and paternalistic 
altruism (the latter attached to consumption of the public good) move each member’s WTP on 
behalf of the household closer to the true aggregate WTP, but only the latter raises aggregate 
WTP. 
JEL Code: D13, D64, H41, Q26. 
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 1. Introduction 
     A substantial and very important research activity has for long been going on to 
elicit the true population welfare effect of increases in public goods provision. The 
most widely used approach is contingent valuation (CV) whereby maximum 
willingness to pay (WTP) is elicited among random population samples. Such survey 
questions can be phrased to individuals in two main alternative ways, as follows:
1 
“How much are you willing to pay, on behalf of your household, for a (small) 
increase in the quantity of a public good?”; or: “How much are you, personally, 
willing to pay for a (small) increase in the quantity of a public good?”. It is an 
important issue since, for a household with m≥2 members, the derived per-person 
value will differ by a factor of m, according to which of the two interpretations of the 
answers to use. The literature is mostly unclear as to which approach is correct, 
whether they are likely to give different or similar results, or even which approach 
that is actually being used in particular cases.
2 Prevailing views (or conjectures) 
among CVM researchers are that individual family members in multi-person families 
(when answering truthfully) may very well represent their families correctly; and that 
the valuation answer to the first question is higher than that to the second, but only 
when family members exhibit interpersonal preferences such as altruism or empathy.
3 
                                                 
1 For a presentation of the CV method see Mitchell and Carson (1989). For overviews of recent 
applications and developments of the method, see Carson, Flores and Meade (2001) and Boyle (2003). 
2 As an example of this uncertainty in the literature, Boyle  (2003) states that “..when the household 
decision maker is the response unit in a contingent valuation study, it is important to identify who is the 
appropriate decision maker in the household. Do households pool their income and make group 
decisions? Do individuals make their own decisions? … .Answers to these questions have important 
implications for the credibility of the welfare estimates from contingent valuation studies.” (p. 120)  
3 Mitchell and Carson (1989), in their seminal presentation of the CV method, claim that “household 
heads” are normally able to answer correctly on behalf of the household, and that this approach ought 
typically to be taken: “...payments for most pure public goods are made at the household level … the 
appropriate sampling procedure is to allow any adult who claims to be a household head to be a 
spokesperson for the household.” (pp 265-266). Otherwise, the prevailing view seems to be that individuals typically underestimate 
household WTP when answering “on behalf of the household”.
4  
     This paper clarifies these issues by embedding the CV procedure in a model of 
household behavior where household members allocate their common resources 
through efficient Nash bargains. I then show that both conjectures stated above are 
correct in a wide set of circumstances, regardless of whether household members are 
selfish or altruistic. An individual’s true WTP on behalf of the household is shown to 
be identical to the sum of household members’ personal WTP levels, if and only if the 
two members have the same marginal valuation of the public good in terms of the 
household good. If different members value the public good differently, a given 
member over (under-) values the public good on behalf of the household when his or 
her value is higher (lower) than that of the other member. On average these values are 
however correct. In a large sample of respondents, individual household members will 
then represent the entire household correctly.  
     In the model, each household is assumed to consist of two members, each with 
cardinal and selfish preferences over three distinct goods: a private good, a household 
good consumed commonly within the household only, and a pure public good 
(consumed by all in society) provided outside of the household. The household is 
assumed to have a given common budget and determines its allocation in an efficient 
asymmetric Nash bargain. A key point is that the model solution implies, for any one 
household member, a lower marginal utility of consumption for the household good 
than for the private good, and this difference is larger for members with lower 
bargaining strength. The aggregate household WTP for the public good is here taken 
as the sum of individual private WTP levels for the public good, in terms of each 
                                                 
4 There is little previous theoretical work to clarify these relationships or formally back up such views. 
  1member’s own private good. Member i’s WTP for the public good on behalf of the 
household is instead derived considering this member’s willingness to give up units of 
the household good. 
    In section 3 I show that the same basic results hold also under “pure” altruism 
among family members, where the utility level of each member enters into the utility 
function of the other. Given that both members are to pay their marginal valuations, 
overall valuations are unaffected by altruism. Individual valuations on behalf of the 
household are however closer to true aggregate household valuation given that they 
differ. In section 4 I instead consider “paternalistic” altruism where a given household 
member cares about the other member’s consumption of the public good. Then 
greater altruism leads to higher public-good valuations. Altruism also here makes one 
member’s WTP on behalf of the household more equal to the sum of individual WTP 
levels, much in the same way as under pure altruism. Section 5 extends the non-
altruistic case to more general utility functions where the three goods are no longer 
strongly separable in consumption. The main conclusions from section 2 (in 
particular, that the individual’s expressed valuation on behalf of the household is 
always correct on the average) then still hold. 
     This  paper  contributes  to  a  resolution of the above-noted long-standing 
controversies and confusions over how to interpret answers to survey questions for 
valuation of public goods. I show that one household member always tends to 
represent the household correctly, at least in expectation, whenever households 
bargain efficiently. Although ignored in much of the earlier family economics 
literature (such as Becker (1991)), several contributions (in particular more recent 
ones) have argued that efficient bargaining among family members is an appropriate 
                                                                                                                                            
The most prominent related reference seems to be the Quiggin (1998) paper discussed below, where 
  2assumption.
5 On the other hand, and as noted in the final section, whenever 
households act non-cooperatively these results no longer hold. Then the marginal 
utilities of private and household goods tend to be similar for any one household 
member, and the valuing member tends to only express his or her purely private 
valuation when asked about household valuation provided that the person has purely 
selfish preferences. We then reach a similar conclusion as Quiggin (1998), who 
studies household versus individual WTP assuming that a purely private good is 
traded off against a public good only.
6 In his model high degrees of altruism are 
necessary to make individual and household valuations similar, something that is 
necessary also here when households act non-cooperatively, but not necessary when 
they act cooperatively. The fundamental difference between Quiggin’s model and 
mine is the introduction of an additional third (household) good here, as in Chen and 
Wooley’s (2001) family allocation model. These issues are commented on further in 
the final section 5, where I also make a strong case for the cooperative solution within 
the household. 
 
2. The basic model with no altruism 
     Consider a household with two members. The household has a given common 
budget R, spent on purely private consumption Ci for members i = 1,2, and on a 
household good consumed jointly by members in the amount H.
7 The family budget 
constraint is then simply R = C1 + C2 + H. The two members bargain over C1, C2 and 
                                                                                                                                            
any difference between the two types of answers is based on altruistic motivations. 
5 See Bergstrom (1997) for a survey, Chen and Woolley (2001) for perhaps the most closely related 
existing theoretical family model, and Browning and Chiappori (1998) and Aura (2002) for recent 
empirical evidence in favor of the household bargaining model. 
6 In Quiggin (1998) one interpretation of the “public” good is as a good consumed exclusively within 
the household. He however does not clarify the implications of this assumption for the equilibrium 
allocation of the “globally public” good, which is the main issue here. 
  3H in an asymmetric Nash bargain with relative bargaining strengths β and 1-β.
8 We 
initially disregard altruism, i.e., no element of other individuals’ utility or 
consumption enters into the utility function of a given member. Member i’s utility 
function is strongly separable in its three arguments, as follows: 
 
(1)                           U i =  ui(Ci) + vi(H) + zi(P), i = 1,2, 
 
where the ui, vi and zi can be viewed as cardinal (von Neumann-Morgenstern), 
increasing and strictly concave utility functions, and fulfil standard Inada conditions, 
i.e., f’ > 0, f’’ < 0 and lim (A→0) f’ = ∞, lim (A→∞) f’ = 0, for f = u, v and z, and A 
= C, H and P, respectively. The Nash product will be expressed as
9
 
 (2) [ ] [ ]
1
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Here Ci0 and H0 are the “conflict” levels of private and common consumption for the 
household members, which we assume to be exogenous; these could, e.g. as in Chen 
and Woolley (2001), be determined as part of a non-cooperative Nash-Cournot 
solution. As long as they are exogenous, however, and the utility function separable as 
here, they do not affect any important aspects of the solutions to be derived in this or 
                                                                                                                                            
7 In our model “public goods” also comprise private goods whose costs are not charged to users, as is 
the case for many educational, health and cultural services in many countries. 
8 We ignore the possibility of family break-up or outside options yielding higher utility than our 
bargaining solution. A divorce option is considered by Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and 
Horney (1981). Our approach here is to depart from an “inside” noncooperative breakdown option, as 
in e.g. Lundberg and Pollak (1993) and Chen and Woolley (2001). Arguably, when household goods 
command a large share of the common budget, the divorce option may be unattractive even for spouses 
with low bargaining power, since this is likely to go together with low relative income as a single. 
9 Note that the zi functions need not be included in NP(1) when the utility function is separable as here, 
since a partial increase in P will then move the efficiently bargained utility and the conflict utility in 
exactly the same way and thus not affect the efficient bargain. This property however does not 
  4the next two sections. In line with the comments in footnote 9 above, neither will any 
exogenous change in P here affect the “conflict” values Ci0 and H0.  
     To derive the Nash bargaining solution, maximize the Lagrangian L(1) = NP(1) - 
λ(C1 + C2 + H – R) with respect toC1, C2 and H, to yield the first-order conditions
10
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Here the Ni are the Nash maximands (i.e., expressions inside the respective square 
brackets in (2)). Eliminating λ implies 
 




















where n = [(1-β)/β](N1/N2). For convenience we from now on take n to be the 
“primitive” of the bargaining solution.
11 We have used the normalization v1’(H) = 
v2’(H) = v’(H), for any equilibrium value of H.
12 When n→0, only member 1 has 
                                                                                                                                            
automatically carry over to the case where utilities are non-separable, as presented and discussed in 
section 5 below. 
10 Asymmetric information about household members’ individual income contributions may complicate 
this problem relative to our exposition. Arguably asymmetric information is a small problem in 
households where members interact daily. It may e.g. be difficult for one member to maintain a high 
consumption level without the other member discovering this. 
11 The standard (cooperative Nash) approach is here of course to take β as the primitive. N1 and N2 and 
thus their ratio are here endogenous, but will in any case change only marginally when exogenous 
variables change marginally. Thus exogenous n is a good approximation to exogenous β.  
12 This is not restrictive, at least not locally in the vicinity of the preferred solution. Since the utility 
functions utilized here fulfil standard vNM criteria of invariance to an increasing linear transformation, 
  5bargaining power; when n = 1, both members have the same “effective bargaining 
power” (as under identical utility functions and β = ½); and when n→∞, only member 
2 has bargaining power. (6)-(7) give the marginal rates of substitution between the 
private goods Ci and the family good H, under an efficient Nash bargaining solution. 
It is a standard (Samuelsonian) solution dictating that the marginal value of the 
household (“local public”) good equal a (weighted) sum of marginal private-good 
values.
13 Generally, when β ∈ (0,1) (and thus n > 0), ui’(Ci) exceeds vi’(H). When R 
increases marginally, the amounts of household goods H or private goods Ci increase. 
In the latter case household member 1 (2) however only receives a fraction 1/(1+n) 
(n/(1+n)) to spend on increased Ci. At an optimum the consumption value of 
increased Ci must equal the value of the increase in H. The marginal utility of 
personal consumption must then exceed that of common consumption.  
          Face now member i with the question: “What is the highest payment you are 
willing to make, on behalf of your household, in return for a (small) increase in the 
public good P; i.e., what, in your view, is your household’s maximum willingness to 
pay (WTP) for such an increase in the public good?” For “small” changes in P, we 
take this to be the same as asking how many units of H member i would be willing to 
give up, with basis in the initial bargaining solution between the two family members, 
in order to obtain this increase in P.
14 We find this value to be 
 
                                                                                                                                            
we may without loss of generality normalize to set marginal utilities of common household 
consumption equal at this point. 
13 My model assumes that the “Coase theorem” holds for intrafamily allocations. In my view, if this 
theorem is to hold approximately anywhere, this is likely to be in intrafamily contexts where the setting 
is typically cooperative and individuals interact almost continuously.  
14 For marginal changes in P, this would be the same as asking what amount of common budget 
resources the two spouses together ought to give up, in the view of individual I, to obtain this small 
change in P. At the margin, a marginal reduction in the common budget can, without loss of generality, 
be assumed to reduce common household consumption H only. 
  6      (8)                    . 2 , 1 ,
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WTPi(H) is household member i’s WTP for the public good in terms of H, here 
interpreted as the member i’s WTP on behalf of the household. 
     Face now member I instead with the question: “What is the highest payment you 
are willing to make, on your own behalf, in return for a (small) increase in the public 
good P; i.e., what, in your view, is your personal maximum willingness to pay (WTP) 
for such an increase in the public good?” Denote this value for household member i 
by WTPi(C), and the sum of the two members’ values by WTP(C). We take WTPi(C) 
to be the correct answer to the alternatively formulated question: “How much are you 
willing to give up, in terms Ci, for a small increase in P?”
15 We find 
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From (6)-(7), WTPi(C) < WTPi(H) since ui’(C) > v’(H). We then have 
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where the latter equality is found using (6)-(7). The ratio of WTP1(H) to WTP(C), 
denoted R(1), is then given by 
 
                                                 
15 The interpretation in this case is that individual i’s total budget for private goods including the 
additional amount of the public good is given. A small increase in P then leads to a small reduction in 
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(11) leads to the following result. 
 
Proposition 1: Assume that the intra-household allocation of private and household 
goods is decided by efficient Nash bargaining, and that there is no altruism. Then 
WTP for a public good, as expressed by household member 1 on behalf of the 
household, is greater (smaller) than the sum of the two household members’ private 
WTP for the good, if and only if member 1’s marginal valuation of the public good in 
terms of the common household good is higher (lower) than that of member 2. 
 
Proposition 1 implies that if and only if the two family members have the same 
marginal value of the public good in terms of the household good, any one of them 
expresses household WTP correctly. Perhaps surprisingly, this result does not depend 
on altruism nor the relative bargaining powers of family members. It only depends on 
efficient Nash bargaining over private and household goods within the household. The 
result also implies that aggregating up individual WTP values stated on behalf of the 
household, across household members, leads to double counting. This contrasts other 
work, in particular Jones-Lee (1992) and Quiggin (1998), where such double counting 
is claimed to follow from altruistic preferences. 
     Certain generalizations are straightforward. First, with m>2 household members 
and a symmetric solution where each member has the same bargaining parameter 1/m, 
the sum of private WTP still equals one member’s WTP in terms of the household 
                                                                                                                                            
Ci, while everything else is unaltered (note in particular that the bargaining solution is unaltered when 
P increases, as commented above.  
  8good given that members’ marginal valuations of the pure public good are identical. 
Secondly, in section 5 below I generalize to a class of more complex utility functions 
where the three goods in question may be complements and substitutes in 
consumption, and still find similar results. Thirdly, while the model framework above 
is cardinal, most of the results readily generalize to an ordinal one where we only 
require efficient household resource allocation over private and household goods. The 
main difference is that the bargaining parameter n would then be indeterminate. Other 
main results (that one household member always represents the household correctly 
given that marginal rates of substitution between the pure public good and the 
household good are the same for both members; and that one member “on average” 
always represents the household correctly) then however still hold. 
 
3. Pure intra-household altruism 
     In this and the next section I generalize the above model in two directions, to take 
into consideration the possibility of altruistic preferences, of two different types. In 
this section I consider the case of only “pure” (nonpaternalistic) intrafamily 
altruism.
16 Each household member now attaches utility to the general utility level 
enjoyed by the other member. The utility of household member i can then be 
expressed as 
 
    (12)          Ui  =  ui(Ci) + vi(H) + zi(P) + αi [uj(Cj) + vj(H) + zj(P)], i, j = 1,2, i≠j. 
 
                                                 
16 We consider only intrafamily altruism. As justified e.g. by Becker (1991) and Jones-Lee (1992), this 
is likely to be the dominating type of altruism for a majority of individuals. 
  9Here αi ∈ (0,1) is a relative weight attached by member i to member j, relative to the 
weight attached to oneself. αi = 1 represents what may be denoted complete altruism, 
which we rule out except as a possible limit case. We may have α1 ≠ α2 whereby 
members have different degrees of altruism. The Nash product is now assumed to be 
given by 
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1
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where N1 and N2 are given from (2).
17 The Lagrangian L(2) is formed in a way 
corresponding to L(1), and maximized with respect to the Ci and H under the budget 
constraint to yield 
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Again we use the normalization v1’(H)=v2’(H)=v’(H), and derive the first-order 
conditions 
 
  (17)-(18)      [ ] ). ( ' ) 1 ( 1 ) ( ' ) ( ) ( ' ) 1 ( 2 1 2 2 1 | 1 2 H v n C u n C u n α α α α + + + = + = +  
                                                 
17 Thus formally, it is the utility gain over the non-cooperative solution for the other individual, and not 
the utility level, that enters into (13). This however changes nothing substantial, as the non-cooperative 
solution is neither in this case altered by exogenous changes in P. 
  10 
The new parameters αi here affect the intrafamily resource allocation, relative to the 
conditions (6)-(7) under no altruism. A marginal increase in P now has total utility 
effect zi’(P) + αizj’(P) for household member i (≠j). Differentiating (12) with respect 
to H and P we find member i’s WTP on behalf of the household as 
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To derive private valuations in this case, it now matters exactly how the valuation 
question is posed to the respondent. Consider the following two possibilities: 
1.  What is your private WTP for an extra unit of the public good, in terms of 
reduced consumption of your own private consumption good, given that you 
only, and not the other family member, is to pay for this good? 
2.  What is your private WTP for an extra unit of the public good, in terms of 
reduced consumption of your own private consumption good, when also the 
other family member pays his or her own private WTP for the good? 
Given that WTP for the public good is elicited from one family member, and only this 
member is to pay, the first interpretation may appear reasonable. WTP values, 
denoted WTPi
N(C), can then be found differentiating (12) with respect to Ci and Z 
(and holding Cj and H constant): 
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Aggregate household WTP is then found aggregating (20) over i, as 
  11 
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When instead all members of society are required to pay for increases in the public 
good, question alternative 2 is more relevant.
18 The WTP measure can then be derived 
from the equation set 
 
     (22)                 dP P z P z dC C u dC C u )) ( ' ) ( ' ( ) ( ' ) ( ' 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 α α + − = +  
     (23)                 dP P z P z dC C u dC C u )) ( ' ) ( ' ( ) ( ' ) ( ' 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 α α + − = + . 
 
Solving (22)-(23) simultaneously for dC1 and dC2 in terms of dP yields (9), as under 
purely selfish preferences. Aggregate household WTP then equals WTP(C) from (10), 
where WTP(C)<WTP
N(C).
19 Intuitively, when member 2 pays, member 1’s utility is 
reduced due to altruistic concerns about member 2’s reduced personal consumption. 
     WTP(C) will in the following be viewed as the true measure of household WTP 
for a small increase in P, as it involves simultaneous changes in C1 and C2 for the two 
household members such that both utilities are kept constant. We then have: 
 
Proposition 2: Assume that the analysis in section 2 applies except that household 
members exhibit pure altruism as defined. Aggregate WTP for the public good is then 
invariant to a change in the degree of altruism. 
 
                                                 
18 A third relevant alternative, important in practical CV applications but not pursued here, is to base 
the WTP question on an assumption that all individuals are to pay the same amount toward the public 
good. 
  12    Compare now individual WTP on behalf of the household, to the “true” sum of 
individual WTP levels, WTP(C). Using (17)-(18), WTP(C) can be expressed as 
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The ratio of WTP1
N(H) to WTP(C), denoted R(2), is 
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We can now demonstrate the following result: 
 
Proposition 3: Assume that marginal valuations of the public good differ. Then one 
individual’s expressed marginal WTP for the public good, on behalf of the household, 
is closer to correct aggregate household WTP, the greater the degree of pure altruism 
for either member. 
 
This result is found differentiating R(2) with respect to the αi. Altruism here leads to 
averaging of marginal valuations across household members. The closer α1 and α2 are 
to one (the “complete altruism” case) the closer R(2) is to one when z1’(P) ≠ z2’(P).  
     Under  pure  altruism,  individual  expressed WTP on behalf of the household is 
always moved in the direction of true aggregate WTP, which is generally unaltered. 
                                                                                                                                            
19 This conclusion is identical to Result 1 in Quiggin (1998); see also Johansson (1994) for similar 
results.  
  13 
4. Paternalistic altruism with respect to the public good 
     In this section I consider “paternalistic” altruism, where the utility of each member 
depends on the other member’s consumption of the public good but no that of other 
goods.
20 This can be relevant e.g. when P is a cultural or educational good and 
members care about each other’s “cultivation” or education level; or when P is health 
or environmental goods and members care about each other’s health state and 
longevity. The underlying motivation for the “altruistic” member may then be at least 
partly selfish.
21 Now the utility of member i is expressed as
22  
 
     (26)                        Ui = ui(Ci) + vi(H) + zi(P) + αi zj(P), i,j = 1,2, i≠j. 
 
With separable utilities the intrafamily resource allocation is unaltered by such 
altruism given that payments for the public good do not change. Thus (3)-(7) still 
describe this allocation. Member i’s WTP on behalf of the household is now  
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20 I here adopt Quiggin’s (1998) terminology; perhaps a better term would be “public-good focussed” 
altruism as used by Jones-Lee (1992). 
21 We are ignoring possible selfishly motivated altruism related to personal or household goods. For 
household goods such effects could be present if increased consumption of common household items 
develops preferences that are more similar among family members, or improves the other person’s 
health status or longevity (as could be the case with a better dwelling, located in a safer and cleaner 
place, or better prepared common meals). For purely private goods, opposite paternalism is possible 
where one member prefers the other member to consume less of particular goods (as when the other 
member overeats, drinks or smokes, or spends time in some hazardous activity). 
22 (26) implies that the other member’s utility of public-good consumption (and thus not the 
consumption level) enters the first member’s utility function. This is a simplification which can be 
motivated if zi(P) represents member i’s actual use of a public good such as cultural or health services. 
  14The expression for aggregate household WTP, as the sum of individual values (in 
terms of the private good), is here WTP
N(C) from (21), as under pure altruism when 
question 1 in section 3 is evoked. Since WTP
N(C)>WTP(C), and this disparity 
increases in the αi, we have 
 
Proposition 4: Assume that each household member’s altruism is paternalistic with 
respect to the other member’s public-good consumption. Then household WTP for the 




N(C), denoted R(3), given by  
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From (28), member 1’s WTP for the public good on behalf of the household equals 
true aggregate household WTP in the special case of (1-α1)z2’(P) = (1-α2)z1’(P). One 
also easily finds, from (28), that when α1 = α2 = α, an increase in α moves R(3) 
closer to unity whenever z1’(P) ≠ z2’(P); when α2 = 0, R(3) increases uniformly in α1; 
and when α1 = 0, R(3) is reduced uniformly in α2. A proportional increase in the 
degree of mutual altruism always makes one member’s valuation on behalf of the 
household more equal to true aggregate valuation, as under pure altruism in section 3. 
Now, however, that when only the valuing member is altruistic, increased altruism 
increases that member’s valuation on behalf of the household, relative to true 
aggregate valuation. The opposite happens when the other member only is altruistic, 
and altruism increases. These cases are intuitively obvious. To take the last case, 
  15increased altruism does not change member 1’s valuation on behalf of the household, 
but increases true aggregate valuation, and R(3) drops. 
 
5. More general preference relationship in the non-altruistic case 
     A possible objection to the model above is that preferences often are not strongly 
separable in the three goods C, H and P in the way assumed. I will now consider 
implications of more general preference relationships for the two household members 
over these goods. For simplicity I now revert to the case of no altruism in section 2. 
Assume that  
 
    (29)                                 Ui = Ui(Ci, H, P),   i = 1,2, 
 
where Ui is a standard (vNM) utility function, assumed strictly concave in Ci, H and 
P, which may generally differ between the two individuals. The Nash bargaining 
solution now has the same basic setup as before. The Nash maximands entering into 
the bargaining solution can now be specified as Ni = Ui(Ci, H, P) – Ui(Ci0, H0, P), i = 
1,2, and the solutions corresponding to (8)-(9) are: 
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Again the uH are normalized to be identical in equilibrium. Simplify also by setting 
cross second derivatives with respect to Ci and H, uiCH, equal to zero; other cases 
complicate without yielding further significant insights. The main new issue is how a 
change in P changes the bargaining solution and thus the equilibrium distribution of 
consumption between the two spouses. This in turn affects individual WTP for a 
  16changed supply of P. In principle such an effect could arise for two different reasons. 
First, relative inside bargaining positions of the two members could be affected. 
Secondly, outside options could be affected. Here we focus on the former effect. This 
implies an assumption (as in the main body of the paper above) that outside options 
are not exercised at equilibrium and that the inside utility level is always higher than 
the outside option level (e.g. from breaking up a marriage). 
     Consider now the effects of an increase in P on C1, C2 and H from changes in the 
bargaining solutions (30)-(31). Since such an increase in P leaves R constant, dH = -
dC1 -dC2, from (1). Differentiating (30)-(31) with respect to C1, C2 and H then yields 
the following approximate solutions:
23
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23 These solutions are likely not to be exact, for at least two separate reasons. First, n and thus the 
“effective bargaining parameters” 1/(1+n) and n/(1+n) are generally affected, while in these 
calculations I take n to be a constant in the same way as above. The qualitative effects of this 
amendment are however small, as the adjustments of the Ni and the respective effective bargaining 
parameters typically go in opposite directions. Thus when e.g. member 1’s net utility Ni goes up in the 
new solution, ceteris paribus, his or her relative bargaining strength is reduced somewhat to eliminate 
part of this increase. The other, and potentially more serious, aspect is that the threat-point values of Ci0 
and H0 may change when P changes. An analysis of such issues requires that the non-cooperative game 
between family members be specified in more detail under such circumstances, something that is left 
for future research. My conjecture is however that effects on equilibrium threat points are small in most 
cases. 
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is a positive determinant. While this solution appears complex in general, we may 
illustrate its main properties by considering two relevant and simpler cases. 
 
Case I: u1CP ≠ 0, u2CP = uiHP = 0, i = 1,2. Here the supply of the public good affects the 
marginal utility of private consumption for household member 1 but no other 
marginal utilities. Now (32)-(34) simplify to 
 








































Consider u1CP > 0: an increase in the supply of P raises the marginal utility of the 
private good for member 1 only. This leads to higher private consumption for member 
1, and to lower common household consumption as well as private consumption for 
person 2. The utility change for member i when P is increased can be expressed as 
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The sum of the two first terms is here positive for member 1 and negative for member 
2. Consequently, member 1 is willing to pay more for the increase in P, than what 
appears from the analysis in section 2 above. 
     Intuitively, the increase in marginal utility of private consumption for member 1 
makes it efficient for the household to also increase member 1’s private consumption 
(in order to fulfil the efficiency conditions (30)-(31)). Consider a more concrete 
example where spouse 1 only is a potentially eager golfer, and the increase in P is the 
building of a public golf course nearby, making golf a new option. This raises the 
marginal utility of private consumption for the golfing spouse, leading the household 
to allocate more of the common resources to this spouse’s golfing hobby. (Thus in 
this particular case, spouse 1’s increase in utility due to a higher P is greater than that 
of spouse 2 for two separate reasons: first, because the direct utility effect, u1P, is 
much higher, but also because the indirect effect via the household bargaining 
solution is positive.) Examples where the marginal utility of private consumption is 
lowered when P is increased are perhaps easier to find. Assume that spouse 1 has a 
medical problem that requires private treatment in the absence of a publicly available 
treatment, and assume that the increase in P implies that such a public treatment 
becomes available. Then spouse 1’s marginal utility of private consumption is 
lowered, implying that the household is willing allocate less of its common resources 
to such costs for spouse 1. This implies that the overall utility change, and WTP, for 
spouse 1 is smaller than that found in section 2 (in the concrete example, though, the 
total utility effect of the change in P may still be much higher for spouse 1, which 
after all has the benefit of the treatment; the main overall positive effect for spouse 2 
may be that private and household consumption are raised). 
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Case II: u1HP ≠ 0, uiCP = u2HP = 0, i = 1,2. Here an increase in P affects the marginal 
utility of H, for spouse 1 only. The effects on consumption are now 
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A positive u1HP now reduces C1, and increases C2 and H. Overall utility of private and 
household consumption is now reduced for member 1, and increased for member 2. 
This is the opposite of what was found in case I. Here, when the marginal utility of 
common household consumption is increased for member 1, the marginal utility of 
private consumption should also be raised for that individual. This in turn implies that 
overall private consumption must fall for that individual. (Private consumption will be 
raised for the other individual, since H is raised and (30)-(31) must still hold.) 
     Consider two concrete examples. First, assume that only spouse 1 suffers from 
noise or air pollution, and that the increase in P takes the form of reductions in such 
pollution. This reduces spouse 1’s utility from having an expensive house location (in 
an expensive neighborhood with low pollution levels to start with), or from taking 
strong defensive measures against pollution such as air filtering and window glazing. 
In this case u1HP < 0. The Nash bargaining solution then dictates that H be lowered 
  20(the couple moves to a less expensive location, or to a house with less defensive 
equipment). Private consumption for spouse 1 is increased (in order to bring the 
marginal utility of C1 down, in line with the reduction in the marginal utility of H for 
spouse 1). Then spouse 1’s utility, and thus WTP for the increase in P, are raised by 
these consumption reallocations. 
     In the other example, assume that a husband (member 1) benefits from his wife’s 
production of certain common household services, such as common meals or home 
cleaning, and that an increase in the public good reduces these benefits (while the 
effect is neutral for the wife; e.g., the husband now gets access to free meals or 
cleaning services from his employer, making him use these services instead of the 
previously-used common-household services). Then also here u1HP < 0, while u1HP = 
0. By the argument above, the husband’s effective relative bargaining power is 
increased when the public good supply increases. His equilibrium utility is raised 
beyond that found under separability, and his WTP for increases in the public good 
raised accordingly, while the wife’s WTP is lowered. 
 
6. Conclusions 
     Efficient  household  bargaining  over private and common-household goods has 
important implications for the way that members of multi-person households value 
public goods, in particular as these values are revealed through questionnaire surveys., 
when a family member is asked to value a public good “on behalf of oneself” 
Assuming efficient Nash bargaining between two household members (as here 
considered reasonable), this good is traded off the public good against that person’s 
private-good consumption. When the member is instead asked to provide a public-
good value “on behalf of the household”, the public good is traded off against 
  21common-household goods. Provided that answers are truthful, individual members’ 
expressed valuation of the public good tends to be correct “on behalf of the 
household”, on the average. The particular member who conducts the valuation, 
overvalues (undervalues) the good on behalf of the household only when he or she has 
a higher (lower) marginal valuation of the public good than the other member. I 
moreover show that such over- or under-valuation is even less of a problem under 
altruism, interpreted either as “pure” altruism, or as mutual “paternalistic altruism” 
with respect to consumption of the public good.  
     Note  that  these  results  depend  strongly on the chosen model of the family, 
whereby household members are assumed to reach efficient and cooperative 
bargaining solutions. As discussed and argued above, this model is highly plausible in 
the family context, and most recent empirical literature dealing with household 
allocation strongly supports it. It may still be of interest to consider alternative cases, 
where household members act non-cooperatively and/or inefficiently. With non-
cooperative household allocations of private and household goods, there will be a 
tendency for marginal valuations of the two types of goods to be similar, for any one 
household member.
24 In such cases the valuation of the pure public good, 
“personally”, and “on behalf of the household”, will tend to be similar. Any one 
person then cannot truthfully represent the entire household. An important future 
research task is here clearly to further investigate the properties of representative 
household behavior. 
     The results found in this paper have important implications for the interpretation of 
results from CV surveys, which have for long been, and today still are, the most 
popular tool for valuing a wide range of public goods, in e.g. the environmental, 
                                                 
24 See Chen and Woolley (2001) for a discussion of properties of such non-cooperative allocations. 
  22health, cultural and transportation sectors. My results indicate that there should 
normally not be any fundamental problem with letting one sample (adult) person 
conduct such valuation on behalf of the household. In a large random sample of 
households, such individual valuations should on average represent the respective 
households correctly, only provided answers are truthful. Summing up individual 
valuations on behalf of households across household members will then lead to 
double counting. Altruism plays no basic role in establishing these results. Still, 
higher degrees of altruism tend to make individual valuations within a household 
more equal, and one person’s valuation on behalf of the household more precise. 
     Several  extensions  can  be  interesting for future analysis. Further research is 
required to determine the relevance of the unitary, bargaining and conflict views on 
household allocation.
25 Secondly, many goods are on a more diffuse continuum 
between our extremes of purely private or household goods. Thirdly, children and 
their preferences need to be incorporated more directly, perhaps as individuals with 
low bargaining power and sharing the common household budget, and subject to 
altruism (by parents). The analysis under either of the two altruism variants 
considered (or a combination) may then apply. Fourthly, altruism outside of the 
household may play important roles, not explored here. 
 
 
                                                 
25 A recent study based on bargaining but emphasizing a conflict view is Anderson and Baland (2002).  
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